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Abstract
This paper investigates the shifting of sales taxes to consumers through retail prices in the
short run. Retail data on gasoline prices are used at the station level within the U.S., including
observations from all fty states and the District of Columbia. A di¤erence-in-di¤erences
approach is employed to identify the short-run e¤ects of the changes in state taxes as of January
1st, 2015, when ve states have increased their gasoline sales taxes, while ve other states have
decreased theirs. States experiencing such changes in sales taxes (between December 31st, 2014
and January 1st, 2015) are analyzed as the treatment group of a natural policy experiment,
where the control group consists of states with no changes in their sales taxes. The results show
that both sales-tax increases and decreases are under-shifted to consumer prices, although
the under-shifting of sales-tax decreases is much higher (i.e., the asymmetric incidence of
sales taxes). The pass-through measures also di¤er signicantly across states, showing the
importance of having a nationwide analysis. The results are robust to the consideration of
retailer characteristics, wholesale prices, retail brand e¤ects and hourly price changes within
each day.
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1 Introduction
The incidence of gasoline sales taxes is a fundamental concept in public economics, because it
determines how economic welfare is distributed between gas stations and consumers due to changes
in taxes. Since gasoline accounts for about 5% of consumer spending and sales taxes are determined
by policy makers, the measurement of the incidence is an essential concern of politicians as well.1
However, there are only a few studies that have attempted to measure the e¤ects of gasoline sales
taxes at the station (i.e., retail-rm) level.2 Having an investigation at the retail level is especially
important for the gasoline market, because each gas station can pass the e¤ects of taxes on to
consumers di¤erently (by over-shifting or under-shifting taxes to consumer prices), which leads a
distribution of tax incidence among gas stations and thus a redistribution of economic welfare even
within consumers purchasing gasoline from di¤erent stations or among stations located in the same
political district.
This paper achieves such an investigation at the gas-station level in the short run. Using retail
prices of regular gasoline obtained from gas stations within the U.S., including observations from all
fty states and the District of Columbia, we investigate the e¤ects of state-level sales tax changes
(on retail prices) that have become e¤ective on January 1st, 2015, when ve states have increased
their sales taxes, while ve others have reduced theirs. Accordingly, these ten states experiencing
changes in their sales taxes (between December 31st, 2014 and January 1st, 2015) are analyzed as
the treatment group of a natural policy experiment, where the control group consists of states with
1According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Price Index, gasoline accounted for 5.1% of
consumer spending, as of October 2014.
2For other retail-rm level studies, see Poterba (1996) and Doyle and Samphantharak (2008). Although they are
not comparable to this paper, there are many other studies focusing on retail level (rather than retail-rm level)
analysis such as by Alm et al. (2009), Li et al. (2012), Devereux et al. (2007), Chouinard et al. (2007) and Fullerton
and Metcalf (2002).
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no changes in their sales taxes. Since all sales tax changes are due to earlier state laws (rather
than market conditions), using a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach is a compelling way to study the
e¤ects of tax changes on retail prices, and it is robust to any identication/endogeneity problem.
Within this context, the main assumption is that the retailers would re-optimize their pricing
decision according to changes in tax rates, since they already know the timing of such changes.
The results of a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach show evidence for asymmetric incidence of
sales taxes. In particular, although both sales-tax increases and decreases are under-shifted to
consumer prices, the under-shifting of sales-tax decreases is much higher. In the case of sales-tax
increases, the under-shifting corresponds to an increase in gasoline prices less than the increase in
sales taxes due to the estimated pass-through coe¢ cients less than one, while in the case of sales-
tax decreases, it corresponds to an increase in prices despite the decrease in sales taxes due to the
estimated pass-through coe¢ cients less than zero. The latter result is interesting in an environment
of gasoline prices decreasing nationwide, because it implies that retailers have either kept their
prices constant or have reduced their prices less than the national average, which has potentially
resulted in higher rates of return on capital (in a perfectly competitive market) or higher markups
(in an environment with imperfect competition). When we further investigate the retailers facing
tax reductions, we in fact observe that the average retailer have reduced its price by only 0.1% after
the average tax reduction of 0.85%, while the retailers in the control group (with no tax changes)
have experienced an average price reduction of 0.71%. Finally, the short-run pass-through measures
di¤er signicantly across states, showing the importance of having a nationwide analysis.
The existing empirical literature on sales tax incidence, mostly focusing on tax shifting, has
mixed evidence in terms of under-shifting (i.e., incomplete pass-through measures of below 100%),
full-shifting (i.e., full pass-through of 100%) or over-shifting of taxes (i.e., more than full pass-
through measures of above 100%) on retail prices. For instance, earlier studies such as by Poterba
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(1996, analyzing clothing prices) have found evidence for both over-shifting and under-shifting,
while studies such as by Besley and Rosen (1999, analyzing commodities such as bananas, bread,
and milk) or by Kenkel (2005, analyzing alcoholic beverages) have found evidence for full-shifting
and over-shifting of sales taxes. However, almost all of these studies are subject to identication
problems (i.e., their analysis potentially su¤er from not distinguishing between market conditions
and policy changes) due to not having a natural policy experiment as in this paper.3
In the context of gasoline retail prices, this paper is closest to the excellent study by Doyle
and Samphantharak (2008; henceforth, DS) who have also considered a natural policy experiment
using a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach to investigate the short-run e¤ects of state-level sales tax
changes in the gasoline retail market. By considering the tax suspension and reinstatements in two
Midwest states, Illinois and Indiana, DS have found that 70% of the tax suspension is passed on to
consumers in the form of lower prices, while 80100% of the tax reinstatements are passed on to
consumers. However, one may criticize their methodology in some aspects, which may potentially
result in biased measures of pass through. First, DS have considered the asymmetry when the
increases and decreases happen at di¤erent times in Illinois and Indiana. Such an approach would
ignore potential changes across these states over time (and thus lead to omitted variable bias);
instead, this paper focuses on the e¤ects of concurrent increases and decreases of sales taxes by
using data on the very same days of December 31st, 2014 and January 1st, 2015 across all states
3There are also other studies in the literature that investigate tax incidence by using aggregate-level (rather than
retail-level) data. For example, Devereux and Lanot (2003, analyzing mortgages) and Chouinard and Perlo¤ (2004,
investigating gasoline taxes) have depicted pass-through measures in the interior between 0% and 100%, respectively.
Other studies such as by Young and Bielinska-Kwapisz (2002) have shown that excise taxes on alcohol are over-shifted.
Similarly, Marion and Muehlegger (2011) have found at least full, and potentially more than full, pass-through of
both federal and state diesel and gasoline taxes to consumers. Also see Eckert (2013) for an excellent survey of
studies based on gasoline retailing.
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for both treatment and control groups, which makes the results robust to similar issues. Second,
in the formal analysis of DS, the only time-varying right-hand-side variable is the policy reform
(i.e., sales tax rate), which ignores any potential change in wholesale prices or brand-specic costs
over time (and thus again lead to omitted variable bias); instead, this paper considers time-varying
wholesale prices and brand-specic costs to resolve such potential issues.4 Third, since DS consider
control variables at the zip-code level, they fail to capture any retailer-specic characteristics in
their short-run di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach analyzing the tax incidence; as an alternative,
this paper considers the change in retail prices which e¤ectively eliminates such characteristics in
the regression analysis. Finally, this paper takes into account potential di¤erences between the
retail prices collected at di¤erent hours of the day, while DS do not have the information on the
hour of day when the data have been collected. The latter issue is important especially if retailers
follow a pattern in their pricing strategy during peak versus o¤-peak hours within a particular day.
Overall, the results in this paper are robust to many of the concerns that one would have in the
literature.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces data and provides descriptive sta-
tistics. Section 3 introduces the estimation methodology in the context of a di¤erence-in-di¤erences
approach. Section 4 depicts the empirical results. Section 5 concludes by providing policy sugges-
tions.
4It is important to note that DS have considered wholesale prices in a separate regression analysis where wholesale
prices have been used as the dependent variable. They have found that the e¤ects of taxes on wholesale prices were
small.
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2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Retail data on gasoline prices have been obtained from MapQuest for December 31st, 2014 and
January 1st, 2015 at the gas-station level, including observations from all fty states and the District
of Columbia.5 MapQuest receives gasoline prices from Oil Price Information Service (OPIS), a
leading provider of petroleum data collecting gas price data based on eet transaction data. The
same data source has been used by many other researchers because of the fact that OPIS has the
best available gasoline price data.6 In particular, the data source of OPIS receives credit card
transactions through exclusive relationships with the leading eet card companies; although OPIS
captures most prices in real-time, if there is not any transaction (using credit cards by the leading
eet card companies) achieved for a particular gas station on a particular day, then OPIS cannot
receive any data. Accordingly, MapQuest gas prices are updated as qualifying transactions are
processed by OPIS. Within this context, although our raw data include 74,264 price observations,
they may have been obtained from di¤erent gas stations across the two days. In order to have a
healthy comparison between the two days, we restricted the analysis to the gas stations for which we
have retail gasoline price data for both days; such a strategy resulted in having data on 41,148 price
observations (coming from 20,574 stations).7 The approximate time of the gasoline-price update is
also provided by MapQuest. The information on the location of gas stations is at the address level.
5We downloaded the gasoline price data at midnight of each day from http://gasprices.mapquest.com/.
6Focusing on other topics, earlier studies such as by Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006), Doyle and Samphantharak
(2008), and Chandra and Tappata (2011) have also used this data set.
7Since our data set concists of credit card transactions of the leading eet card companies, resctricting the data to
the gas stations that have observations on both days may result in missing valuable information of gasoline purchases
through non-credit-card transactions such as cash or debit card. Nevertheless, as shown by studies such as by Carow
and Staten (1999), the majority of the gasoline purchases are achieved by credit card, even back in 1992. Accordingly,
although our strategy may lead into a certain amount of bias, we dont expect it to have a large impact in our results.
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In order to give the reader a better idea, a typical retailer is a BP gas station located at 11590 E
10 Mile Road, Warren, MI 48089 charging regular gasoline prices of $2.06 and $2.00 on December
31st and January 1st, respectively. During the sample period, the average gasoline prices are about
$2.28 and $2.26 on December 31st and January 1st, respectively, with the same standard deviation
of 31 cents. Average prices for states that have experienced a sales tax change (and other states)
are given in Table 1, where they range between $2.00 (for Nebraska) and $2.76 (for New York)
on December 31st and between $2.06 (for Nebraska) and $2.75 (for New York) on January 1st.
Average price changes between the two days range between  3:18 cents (for Nebraska) and 2:10
cents (for Kentucky), suggesting a signicant heterogeneity across states. This heterogeneity is also
supported by the last column where average price changes are compared with the average national
price decrease of 1:43 cents.
Gasoline sales taxes have been obtained from The Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy.8
Changes in these taxes on January 1st, 2015 are given in Table 1, where Pennsylvania has experi-
enced the highest increase (of 9.8 cents) and Kentucky has experienced the highest reduction (of
4.3 cents). The sales tax increases in Pennsylvania, Virginia and Maryland have taken place as
scheduled under major transportation nance laws; retailers in North Carolina and Florida have
experienced sales tax increases as a result of formulas written into state laws that update sales
taxes each year alongside ination or gasoline prices; nally, retailers in the states of New York,
Nebraska, Vermont, West Virginia and Kentucky have experienced lower sales taxes, since part of
the sales tax depends on the price of gasoline in these states according their law. Therefore, the
sales tax changes investigated in this paper have been determined by earlier state laws rather than
any market conditions, which has allowed us study the e¤ects of tax changes on retail prices in a
compelling way that is robust to any identication/endogeneity problem.
8www.itep.org
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When the changes in sales taxes are compared with the relative average prices changes in Ta-
ble 1, it is evident that retailers located in states with increased sales taxes have increased their
prices, while there is mixed evidence for retailers located in states with reduced sales taxes. Such
asymmetric adjustment of prices is consistent with earlier studies such as by Chouinard and Perlo¤
(2004) who show that the gasoline tax e¤ects vary across states based on size, and Devereux et al.
(2007) who discuss tax e¤ects near borders.9 For sure, we need a formal analysis (as we will have,
below) in order to investigate such asymmetric adjustment of prices within this paper.
In order to control for di¤erences across brands, brand xed e¤ects are included in the analysis,
below, using the brand information also obtained from MapQuest. In order to control for di¤erences
across time of observation/update, the corresponding hour xed e¤ects are also included in the
analysis, below, for each day. We also control for the wholesale price e¤ects by considering xed
e¤ects for the nearest rener of each gas station; this is a very similar approach as in Doyle and
Samphantharak (2008) who use the rack price from the nearest renery. The list and exact locations
of gasoline-producing reners, which have been used to nd the nearest rener for each gas station,
have been obtained from Oil Change International.10
3 Estimation Methodology
We are interested in the pass-through of sales taxes on retail prices. In order to identify the
policy change, we follow a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach for which we take the gasoline sales
9Also see Balke et al. (1998) and Bachmeier and Gri¢ n (2003) who discuss the relationship between crude oil
and gasoline prices through an asymmetric adjustment.
10The web page is http://reneryreport.org/. We considered the possibility of gas stations purchasing gasoline
from both U.S. and Canadian reners due to the open nature of trade between the two countries, as stipulated by
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). There are 131 gasoline-producing reners in this list, where
117 reners are located in the U.S. and 14 reners are located in Canada.
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tax changes between December 31st, 2014 and January 1st, 2015 as a natural policy experiment.
E¤ective on January 1st, ve states (of Pennsylvania, Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, and
Florida) have increases their sales taxes, while ve other states (of New York, Nebraska, Vermont,
West Virginia, and Kentucky) have reduced theirs. We dene the retailers located in these ten
states as the treatment group, while the retailers in remaining states with no sales tax changes are
dened as the control group.
Before moving to the technical details of the econometric model, we start with a specication
check by having a graphical comparison of gasoline prices in treatment versus control groups in
Figure 1. This is a before-and-after analysis for the average retail prices in the corresponding group
of states covering the days between December 30th and January 1st.11 As is evident, although there
is a common trend of gasoline prices between December 30th and December 31st across all groups,
the treatment groups deviate from this trend after the changes in sales taxes on January 1st, while
the control group continues having the same trend. Therefore, there is evidence for a structural
break in the retail price data due to policy changes on sales taxes. Although it is expected for the
retailers in states with higher sales taxes to have higher prices as of January 1st, it is interesting to
observe that the retailers in states with lower sales taxes have also increased their prices. Hence,
asymmetric incidence of sales taxes is observed in the before-and-after analysis, which is the main
motivation behind the following technical analysis.
In terms of the theoretical framework, we consider a exible approach that allows for both perfect
and imperfect competition. When retail prices are in a multiplicative form, the latter corresponds
to the case of market power with gross markups higher than one, while the former implies gross
markup of one. Within this context, following Besley and Rosen (1999), we consider the following
11The details of the data are the same as in the previous section for December 30th.
8
equilibrium price expression for tax-inclusive gasoline retail prices:
RetailPricesbt = Markupsbt  [MarginalCostsbt  SalesTaxsbt] (1)
where s represents the station, b represents the brand, and t represents the time; Markupsbt is the
gross markup, MarginalCostsbt is the marginal cost of retailing, and SalesTaxsbt is the gross ad
valorem sales tax. This is the standard expression representing gasoline retail prices as markups
over marginal costs. It is important to emphasize that both Markupsbt and MarginalCostsbt may
be functions of SalesTaxsbt; they may also be functions of wholesale prices, brand-specic costs
(e.g., Chevron including Techron into its gasoline), time-varying costs (that are common across
all gas stations) as well as other characteristics of station s that are constant over time (e.g., any
demand shifter across stations such as being in the treatment or the control group, the geographical
characteristics, having a car wash or a convenience store, etc.).
Accordingly, after assuming that Markupsbt and MarginalCostsbt are connected to wholesale
prices, brand-specic costs, time-varying costs, and station-specic characteristics in a log-linear
way, the log version of Equation 1 can be written as follows:
ln (RetailPricesbt) = 1 ln (SalesTaxsbt) + 
W
sbt + 
B
sbt + t + s + "sbt (2)
where Wsbt represents wholesale prices, 
B
sbt represents brand-specic costs, t is time-varying costs
that are common across all gas stations, and s represents station-specic factors.12 The interpreta-
tion of the coe¢ cient 1 in front of SalesTaxsbt, which also represents the elasticity of RetailPricesbt
with respect to SalesTaxsbt, is the key in this paper. In particular, since gasoline retail price data
12Having a log-linear expression is useful to interpret the coe¢ cients as elasticities. Moreover, such a strategy is
also consistent with studies such as Doyle and Samphantharak (2008); hence, it makes comparison with the existing
literature much easier. Nevertheless, for insterested readers, it is important to emphasize that we also considered
the linear version of this expression where all variables were in levels (rather than logs). The corresponding results,
which are available upon request, were virtually the same.
9
that we have are tax-inclusive, the case of 1 = 1 represents tax-inclusive retail prices perfectly
reecting any sales taxes levied on them (i.e., full-shifting); this is the case that one would observe
when the combined e¤ects of SalesTaxsbt on Markupsbt and MarginalCostsbt are none. Within this
context, the case of 1 > 1 would mean sales taxes being over-shifted to consumer prices (i.e.,
consumers face changes in prices more than the change in taxes), while the case of 1 < 1 would
mean sales taxes being under-shifted to consumer prices (i.e., consumers face changes in prices less
than the change in taxes).
The case of over-shifting (1 > 1) can occur when the combined e¤ects of SalesTaxsbt onMarkupsbt
and MarginalCostsbt are positive, while the case of under-shifting (1 < 1) can occur when such
e¤ects are negative. It is implied that over-shifting can still occur even in the case of perfect
competition (where Markupsbt = 1) if there are increasing returns to scale, since MarginalCostsbt
would increase with SalesTaxsbt in such a case; similarly, under-shifting can still occur if there are
decreasing returns to scale, since MarginalCostsbt would decrease with SalesTaxsbt in such a case
(see McCorriston et al, 2001). Moreover, in both cases of increasing and decreasing returns to
scale, if the market is imperfectly competitive, it is possible that the overall e¤ects of SalesTaxsbt
on RetailPricesbt may either be cancelled out or be magnied, since Markupsbt may change with
the quantity sold due to market power (i.e., the case of variable markups as in Amiti et al., 2014
or DeLoecker et al., 2016). In sum, the theory is silent regarding the value of 1 (i.e., the tax
incidence); it is rather an empirical question.
Compared to earlier studies employing di¤erence-in-di¤erences approaches, such as by Doyle
and Samphantharak (2008) who only consider the change in taxes as the only time-varying factor,
the price expression introduced above is richer in terms of considering time-varying wholesale prices
and brand-specic costs. Such a strategy will e¤ectively remove any potential bias in the estimated
measures of pass-through simply because retail prices on a particular day may change due to these
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factors as well. Moreover, Doyle and Samphantharak (2008) only consider brand and zip-code
level variables (that are constant over time) to measure the demand shifters in their analysis; in
comparison, our analysis is again richer in terms of considering station-specic demand shifters (i.e.,
s).
Since our analysis focuses on the pass-through of gasoline sales taxes on gasoline prices through
an identication strategy of using January 1st as the time of the reform, we estimate the rst-
di¤erenced version Equation 2 as follows:
 ln (RetailPricesbt) = 
+
1 ln (SalesTaxIncreasesbt) + 
 
1 ln (SalesTaxReductionsbt) (3)
+Wsbt +
B
sbt +t + "
0
sbt
where we have distinguished between the e¤ects of tax increases (through +1 ) and tax reductions
(through  1 ) in order to take into account the asymmetric incidence of sales taxes; hence, we totally
have two treatment groups (representing the retailers located in states with tax changes) and one
control group (representing the retailers located in states with no tax changes). Taking the rst
di¤erence of Equation 2 has e¤ectively removed retailer/station xed e¤ects s. We estimate this
expression by using data on station prices RetailPricesbt, data on gasoline sales taxes SalesTaxsbt to-
gether with closest-rener Wsbt and brand xed e¤ects 
B
sbt (in order to control for wholesale price
and brand-related cost changes that are unique/constant due to considering the changes between
December 31st, 2014 and January 1st, 2015). Similarly, since the variables represent percentage
changes between December 31st, 2014 and January 1st, 2015, t is just a constant representing the
average percentage change in gasoline prices within the U.S. on January 1st. Finally, we use hour
xed e¤ects in order to control for the di¤erences due to the approximate time of the gasoline-price
update provided by MapQuest.
In order to measure state-specic tax shifting, as an alternative estimation strategy, we also
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estimate the following version of Equation 3:
 ln (RetailPricesbt) = 
state
1  ln (SalesTaxsbt) + 
W
sbt +
B
sbt +t + "
0
sbt (4)
where we consider state-specic pass-through of gasoline sales taxes through state-specic state1
estimates. Such an empirical strategy will show whether there is any heterogeneity across states
that have experienced sales tax changes.
4 Estimation Results
The estimation results using Equation 3 are given in Table 2. As is evident in columns (1) and
(2), both sales tax increases and decreases are under-shifted to consumer prices, on average across
states. While under-shifting represented by the coe¢ cient of 0:09 in the case of a sales-tax increase
corresponds to an increase in prices less than the increase in sales taxes, under-shifting represented
by the coe¢ cient of  0:97 in the case of a sales-tax reduction corresponds to an increase in prices
despite the decrease in sales taxes. These results are robust to the consideration of all xed e¤ects.
The pass-through of sales tax increases (of about 0:09) is much lower compared to the existing
literature, potentially due to the reasons discussed in detail in the introduction section. Nevertheless,
we should mention one more time that the results of this paper corresponds to the short-run tax
shifting, while the existing studies have mostly considered long-run analyses, with the exception by
Doyle and Samphantharak (2008). Nevertheless, the pass-through of sales tax reductions, which is
 0:97, is interesting in an environment of gasoline prices decreasing nationwide, because it implies
that retailers have either kept their prices constant or have reduced their prices less than the
national average, which has potentially resulted in higher rates of return on capital (in a perfectly
competitive market) or higher markups (in an environment with imperfect competition). When we
further investigate the retailers facing tax reductions, we in fact observe that the average retailer
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has reduced its price by only 0.1% after the average tax reduction of 0.85%, while the retailers in
the control group (with no tax changes) have experienced an average price reduction of 0.71%.
Since the average sales tax increase (reduction) is about 1:49% (0:85%), it is implied that gas
stations facing a sales tax increase (reduction) have increased their prices by about 0:13% (0:82%)
on average, compared to the nationwide reduction in gasoline prices (measured by the constant of
t in the regressions) which is about 0:19%, after controlling for wholesale prices, brand-specic
costs and the hour of data collection within each day.
State-specic elasticities (due to the estimation of Equation 4) are also given in Table 2 where
pass-through measures range between 0:32 (for North Carolina) and  1:09 (for Vermont), when
all control variables are considered in column (3); they range between 0:94 (for Nebraska) and
 0:41 (for Kentucky) when xed e¤ects are excluded in column (4). When all control variables
are considered in column (3), it is evident that sales-tax increases are under-shifted to consumer
prices across all states, except for Florida (which has the lowest rate of increase in sales taxes)
with a statistically zero pass-through of taxes. The highest tax pass-through in the case of a
sales-tax increase belongs to North Carolina with a signicant coe¢ cient of 0:32, while the lowest
pass-through belongs to Pennsylvania with a signicant coe¢ cient of 0:04. It is also evident in
column (3) that sales-tax reductions are highly under-shifted to consumer prices across all states,
except for Nebraska and New York (which have the two lowest rates of sales-tax reductions) with
a statistically zero pass-through of taxes. The highest tax pass-through in the case of a sales-tax
decrease belongs to Kentucky with a signicant coe¢ cient of  0:42, while the lowest pass-through
belongs to Vermont with a signicant coe¢ cient of  1:09. Hence, rather than focusing on a specic
state/region, a nationwide analysis with the appropriate control variables is essential to measure
the asymmetric tax incidence within the U.S..
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5 Conclusion and Policy Implications
Policy makers determine sales taxes based on measures of pass-through (i.e., shifting of the tax), be-
cause the distribution of economic welfare among consumers and producers/retailers in an economy,
the so called tax incidence, is determined through such measures. Therefore, there is no debate on
how important these measures are. However, when it comes to the actual measurement, only few
studies have achieved an investigation at the level of the retailer, which is essential to understand
how economic welfare is distributed within consumers shopping from alternative retailers or within
producers/retailers even located in the same political district.
This paper has shown that both gasoline sales-tax increases and decreases are under-shifted to
consumer gasoline prices. While this under-shifting corresponds to an increase in gasoline prices
less than the increase in sales taxes due to the estimated pass-through coe¢ cients less than one, it
corresponds to an increase in prices despite the decrease in sales taxes due to the estimated pass-
through coe¢ cients less than zero. Based on our discussion in the methodology section regarding
the linkage among retail prices, marginal costs and markups, it is implied that the combined e¤ects
of sales taxes on marginal costs and markups are negative, although it is not possible to distinguish
between the pure e¤ects of sales taxes on marginal costs versus markups due to the lack of quantity
data on gasoline retail market. When consumers optimize, for the case of sales-tax increases (de-
creases), the under-shifting can be explained by either decreasing (increasing) returns to scale or
variable markups increasing (decreasing) with quantities sold or a combination of the two. However,
when there are consumer optimization failures as in Chetty et al. (2009), the di¤erence between the
e¤ects of sales-tax increases and decreases on retail prices can also be explained by such failures;
we need more search along these lines in order to understand such linkages.
Regarding robustness, the results in this paper are immune to any identication/endogeneity
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issues, since a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach is employed to investigate the e¤ects of the changes
in state taxes as of January 1st, 2015, when ve states have increased their gasoline sales taxes,
while ve other states have decreased theirs. Since these tax changes have been achieved due to
earlier state laws rather than market conditions, states experiencing such changes in sales taxes are
considered as the treatment group of a natural policy experiment, where the control group consists
of states with no changes in their sales taxes. Such a strategy corresponds to a compelling way
to study the e¤ects of tax changes on retail prices. Finally, controlling for retailer characteristics,
wholesale prices, retail brand e¤ects, and the hour of the day when retail price data are collected
has resulted in a robust set of results for policy makers.
The main policy suggestion of this paper is that there is signicant heterogeneity across retailers
in di¤erent U.S. states in terms of how they shift sales taxes, supporting the investigation strategy
in this paper at the national level. Therefore, a policy maker cannot simply work with a single set
of numbers provided in the literature, which potentially su¤er from problems such as not properly
considering retailer data/characteristics; having regional (rather than nationwide) analyses; or not
properly controlling for wholesale prices, retail brand e¤ects or the hour of the data collection
within each day. Although this paper has achieved an analysis by taking into account all of these
dimensions in the short-run, more needs to be done in future research, including an analysis of tax
incidence at the retail level in the long-run that is important for individual welfare and long-term
budget planning. In particular, with longer periods of data, the limitations that we have (e.g.,
having data for only two days or January 1st being a major holiday) can be removed by considering
longer pre- and post-treatment periods that would result in further support to the results in this
paper.
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics 
 Changes in Sales Taxes (cents) 
Average Price on 
December 31st 
(dollars per gallon) 
Average Price on 
January 1st  
(dollars per gallon) 
Average Change in 
Prices (cents) 
Relative Average 
Change in Prices 
(cents) 
Pennsylvania (+) 9.8 2.57 2.54 -1.40 0.03 
Virginia (+) 5.1 2.10 2.12 -1.21 0.22 
Maryland (+) 2.9 2.40 2.40 -0.82 0.61 
North Carolina (+) 1.0 2.30 2.29 -1.08 0.35 
Florida (+) 0.3 2.30 2.31 -1.43 0.00 
New York (-) -0.6 2.76 2.75 -1.70 -0.27 
Nebraska (-) -0.8 2.00 2.06 -3.18 -1.75 
Vermont (-) -0.8 2.68 2.65 -1.06 0.37 
West Virginia (-) -0.9 2.50 2.41 -1.08 0.35 
Kentucky (-) -4.3 2.16 2.15 2.10 3.53 
Remaining States 0.0 2.24 2.22 -1.54 -0.11 
Notes: (+) represents states with a sales tax increase, while (-) represents states with a sales tax reduction. The national average 
decrease on January 1st was 1.43 cents which have been used to calculate relative average change in prices in the last column.  
Table 2 – Estimation Results 
 Pass-through of Sales Taxes (𝛽1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sales Tax Increases 0.09*** (0.02) 0.06* (0.03)   
Sales Tax Reductions -0.97*** (0.02) -0.91*** (0.06)   
Pennsylvania (+)   0.04*** (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 
Virginia (+)   0.04 (0.03) 0.03 (0.02) 
Maryland (+)   0.12*** (0.04) 0.12*** (0.03) 
North Carolina (+)   0.32* (0.17) 0.24** (0.10) 
Florida (+)   0.46 (0.37) 0.30 (0.33) 
New York (-)   -0.15 (0.10) -0.15 (0.16) 
Nebraska (-)   0.31 (0.28) 0.94*** (0.12) 
Vermont (-)   -1.09*** (0.18) -0.37*** (0.12) 
West Virginia (-)   -0.77*** (0.20) -0.28** (0.11) 
Kentucky (-)   -0.42*** (0.02) -0.41*** (0.02) 
Refiner Fixed Effects YES NO YES NO 
Brand Fixed Effects YES NO YES NO 
Hour Fixed Effects YES NO YES NO 
R-Squared 0.139 0.013 0.139 0.013 
Notes: (+) represents the states with a sales tax increase, while (-) represents states with a sales tax reduction; see Table 1 for the exact 
changes in taxes. Standard errors clustered by state are given in parenthesis; *, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1%  levels. The sample size is 20,574 in all regressions. Hour fixed effects control for the hour of data collection within each day.  
 
Figure 1 – Average Gasoline Prices in Control versus Treatment Groups 
 
Notes: In order to focus on trends over time (rather than scales), average gasoline prices of the treatment groups have been shifted 
such that all lines intersect on December 31st. 
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